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In recent years, Americans have been shaken by numerous
prominent acts of hate-based violence. In December 1993,
Colin Ferguson, an African American, opened fire on Caucasian
and Asian-American passengers of a Long Island Railroad train,
On June 7, 1998, several
killing six and injuring nineteen.'
white supremacists in Jasper, Texas beat forty-nine-year-old African-American James Byrd Jr., tied him to the back of a pickup
truck, and dragged him to his death.2 In October 1998, Matthew Shepard-a gay University of Wyoming student-was savagely beaten, tied to a fence, and left to die. 3 On August 10,
1999, former Aryan Nation member Buford Furrow, Jr. fired

Law Clerk to judge Norman H. Stahl, United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997. I wish to thankJohn Greabe, Dan Wenner,
and the editors of The Journalof Criminal Law and Criminology for their insights and
criticisms. I also thank Professor Frederick M. Lawrence for writing a fine book worthy of extended consideration and debate.
' Se e.g., Curt Simmons, Sharpton: Ban All Handguns in State, NEwsDAY, Dec. 13,
1993, at 18; Pat Milton, Racial Bias Sparked Bloodbath: 'Tve Done Bad" Suspect's Notes
Target Whites, Asians Detail Grudges Against Many, THE RECORD, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY,
Dec. 9, 1993, at Al.
See, e.g., Terri Langford, Jasper Tries to Heal Divide After 3 Dragging-Death Trials,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 1999, at A21; The Year's Top Stories, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec.
26, 1999, at 20.
' See, e.g., Vigil Plannedfor Wyoming Student, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 1998, at 5,
available in 1998 WL 7803563; Sharon ShawJohnson, Hate; We Can Combat HatredBut Not By RemainingSilent DAYTON DAiLYNEWS, Mar. 18, 1999, at A20.
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upon children in a Los Angeles Jewish Community Center, injuring five; he later asserted that he had conceived of his attack
as "a wake-up call to America to killJews."4 The list goes on and
on.
In Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law,5 Frederick M. Lawrence argues that criminals motivated by bias6 can (as
a constitutional matter) and should (as a prudential matter) be
punished more severely than those who are not so motivated
but who commit otherwise identical crimes. Part I of this Book
Review sets out Lawrence's arguments in some detail. Part II
probes and criticizes several of these arguments. I do not dispute that those who commit crimes in an attempt to strike fear
into the hearts of the victim and the victim's community, and
especially those who succeed in that regard, are ripe candidates
for enhanced criminal punishment. I do, however, challenge
the means whereby Lawrence proposes to differentiate those
who deserve such penalty enhancement from those who do not,
and I suggest that a different approach would better effectuate
his ends. I contend that two of the central hurdles facing the
case for penalty enhancement-specifically, the Eighth
Amendment's bar on excessive criminal punishment and the
First Amendment's prohibition against content-based government restriction on a citizen's thought or speech-might be
more convincingly surmounted by a focus on the harms inflicted by hate crimes rather than on bias per se.
I. PUNISHINGHATE. LAWRENCE'S ARGUMENT
Lawrence notes that the issues raised by bias crimes and the
punishment of those crimes implicate "three fundamental values of the American polity: equality, free expression, and federalism" (p. 2). He thus centers his inquiry on three interrelated
questions:
Must a society that is dedicated to equality treat bias crimes differently
from other crimes, and must it enhance the punishment of these

crimes? May a society that is also dedicated to freedom of expression
' See, e.g., Robert Macy, L.A. Suspect Surrenders:SupremacistHeld in Vegas in Shootings,
CHi. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at 3.
FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAs CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
(1999).

'

'Lawrence uses the nouns "bias" and "hate" interchangeably; for the sake of clarity
and consistency, I will as well.
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and belief enhance the punishment of bias crimes? Is a prominent federal role in the prosecution and punishment of bias crimes consistent
with the proper division of authority between state (and local) government and the federal government in our political system? (p. 2).

For Lawrence, the correct answer is, in each instance, "yes."
Moreover, he contends that enhanced punishment is not simply
permitted, but in fact "mandated by our societal commitment to
the equality ideal" (p. 3).
Lawrence first distinguishes bias crimes from their "parallel"
alternatives. Some criminals, he notes, act with utter disregard
for the identities of their victims (p. 9). Others-those, for example, who commit crimes of passion or who exact premeditated revenge-choose their victims with specific reference to
their identities and, in fact, would not commit the same crime
against any other target (p. 9). Bias crimes fall into a third class;
they "are crimes in which distinct identifying characteristics of
the victim are critical to the perpetrator's choice of victim," but
"in which the individual identity of the victim is irrelevant" (p.
9). Although the precise boundaries separating these three
categories will always be difficult to discern, Lawrence proposes
that an offense is only a bias crime if it would not have been
committed but for the victim's membership in a particular
group (p. 10).7 What matters most, though, is not the desire to
inflict harm upon certain groups (or members thereof), but the
underlying animus itself: "Hate-based violence is a bias crime
only when the hatred is connected with antipathy for a racial or
ethnic group or for an individual because of his membership in
that group" (p. 9).
Lawrence next considers which groups qualify for the protection of hate crime laws. He argues that in order for the
criminal law to enhance punishment for a bias crime, the "antipathy [animating the offense] must exist in a social context,
that is, it must be an animus that is shared by others in the culture and that is a recognizable social pathology within the culture" (p. 11). Of apparently great significance are the questions
whether the victim class has endured a "history of discrimination" and whether "any ideology or world view ... connects
those who do not trust them" (p. 12). Lawrence expresses his
7 Presumably,

we can take Lawrence here to mean "group or groups." That is, if
an assailant hates both African- and Latino-Americans and would have attacked a victim of either sort, his actions would still, in Lawrence's view, amount to a bias crime.
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hesitance "to identify a definitive list of characteristics that yield
groups that might properly be included in a bias crime statute,"
(p. 13) but elsewhere he is less coy: "As a normative matter,
'bias' should include bigotry on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and, in certain instances, gender" (p. 3).
The inclusion of gender, Lawrence acknowledges, poses
particularly difficult problems. In cases of acquaintance rape
and domestic violence, the victim's gender plays a central role,
but her particular identity is crucial as well. Nonetheless, Lawrence would label such attacks bias crimes, because they "attack
women as a means of enforcing a particular social hierarchy....
The lack of a prior relationship may be a description of most
bias crimes, but it is not a sine qua non for all bias crimes" (p.
16). What matters most, Lawrence maintains, is the "but for"
test described above: if the victim had not been female, would
the crime still have been committed?
Lawrence also supports extending the bias crime label to
cover attacks motivated by the victim's sexual orientation. As he
writes, "if one of the purposes of bias crime statutes is to protect
frequently victimized groups, sexual orientation is particularly
worthy of inclusion" (p. 18). Lawrence notes that some critics
assert that homosexuality is a "mutable" characteristic-that is,
that homosexuals are not born, but made, and can be unmadeand that sexual orientation is therefore a classification unfit for
protection under hate crimes statutes. Lawrence gracefully dispenses with such claims: first, the mutability of homosexuality
"is far from clear." There is much evidence that sexual orientation is indeed immutable, whether for genetic reasons alone, or
for some combination of genetic and environmental reasons (p.
18). Second, there is no obvious reason to confer talismanic
significance upon immutability.
The mutability argument
"could [also] be made with respect to religion, one of the classic
bias crime characteristics" (p. 19). That argument, then, proves
too much, as it would strip bias crime protection away from
Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, or Baptists as well as from homosexuals.
Lawrence next presents data concerning the prevalence of
hate-based violence. Although the evidence is mixed, Lawrence
concludes that bias crimes in the United States have become increasingly frequent since the mid-1980s (pp. 21-25). In addition, Lawrence contends that those crimes have become more
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violent; "property crimes such as spray painting, defacement,
and graffiti" have given way "to personal crimes such as assault,
threat, and harassment" (p. 21). Lawrence cites several potential culprits for the apparent rise in hate-based violence, including "the shrinking of the middle class," "the rise of a tenuous,
service-oriented economy" (p. 25), and the Internet's role in facilitating communication among formerly isolated bigots (p.
24). He concludes that these factors, as well as the rise of white
supremacist groups and the militia movement and an increase
in hate crimes perpetrated by, rather than against, AfricanAmericans, all suggest that America's bias crime problem will
continue to fester for the foreseeable future (pp. 21-28).
Having defined the terms of the hate crime debate and
stated his case for its growing relevance, Lawrence attempts to
distinguish bias crimes from their "parallel" analogues. He first
notes that "virtually every state now expressly criminalizes bias
crimes" (p. 29), and describes the forms that these states' hate
crime statutes typically assume. One, which Lawrence calls the
"discriminatory selection model," requires that the defendant
select the victim on the basis of the victim's membership in a
particular group (p. 30). Such selection could be motivated by
hatred for that group, but need not be (p. 30). For example, a
thief who opts to rob a woman on the assumption that she will
be wearing more jewelry or will be less capable of resistance
than a man has selected his victim on the ground that she is female, but has not exhibited any hatred against women. The
other variety of bias crime statute, which looks for "racial animus, " requires that the defendant acted out of hatred for the
group to which a victim belongs or for the individual by virtue
of being a member of that group (p. 30). "This model is consonant with the classical understanding of prejudice as involving
more than differential treatment on the basis of the victim's
race" (p. 34).9 Finally, Lawrence notes that many states have
enacted "because of' bias crime statutes, which "require only
that the defendant has committed the .
8 Though

.

. crime .

.

. because of

Lawrence labels this model "racial animus," the category includes relig-

ion-, gender-, and sexuality-based violence as well.
' It also falls closer to FBI's definition of hate crime, which singles out criminal
conduct motivated by a "preformed negative opinion or attitude toward a group of
persons based on their race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual orientation." LAWRENCE, supranote 5, at 35 (quoting FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OFJusTcE, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDEUNES 4 (1993)).
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the victim's race" (p. 36). These statutes, Lawrence argues,
might fall closer to either of his two primary categories, for it is
unclear whether "because of'implies only discriminatory selection or in fact requires malice toward the target community.
It is worth noting that we can imagine criminals whose acts
would be covered by a statute of the "discriminatory selection"
variety but not by one of the "racial animus" sort-for example,
the purse snatcher described above. The reverse, though, is not
true: any crime meeting the "racial animus" requirement will by
definition involve discriminatory selection (pp. 73-74).
Lawrence next notes that questions of punishment must always be considered in light of particular justifications for the
criminal sanction. He thus briefly describes the two dominant
schools of punishment theory. The first, retributivism, justifies
punishment on the basis of the offender's desert. This approach holds that a criminal "deserves punishment because he
has violated the norms of society imbedded in the criminal law"
(p. 46). The second rationale, based on utilitarian moral philosophy, focuses on the consequences of punishment, andjustifies punishment only to the extent that it will improve overall
social welfare. Specifically, for the utilitarian, punishment is
typically justified on the basis of its capacity (1) to deter the
punished individual from offending again, (2) to deter other
individuals from offending, (3) to rehabilitate the offender so as
to reduce the chances that he will offend again, and (4) to incapacitate the offender and thus to prevent him from offending
again while incarcerated (p. 46).
Both of these rationales, Lawrence points out, incorporate a
proportionality requirement. Retributivism only requires punishment-and only permits it-to the extent it repays the debt
the offender owes to society (pp. 46-47). The utilitarian approach sets punishment at the "level that is sufficient to deter
the commission of [a particular] crime[]" (p. 48). More severe
crimes will, on the whole, call for more stringent deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation, and thus more severe punishment.
Lawrence believes that utilitarianism and retributivism both
justify enhanced penalties for those who commit bias crimes.
He argues that such crimes should be punished more severely
than their "parallel crimes," because the harm caused by crimes
in the former class will exceed that caused by crimes in the latter class. First, "[b]ias crimes are far more likely to be violent
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than are other crimes" (p. 39). Crimes rooted in bias more frequently involve violence, and violent crimes stemming from bias
are "far more likely.., to involve serious physical injury to the
victim" (p. 39). According to one study cited by Lawrence,
"nearly 75 percent of the victims of bias-motivated assaults suffered physical injury, whereas the national average for assaults
generally is closer to 30 percent" (p. 39). Second, Lawrence
contends that a bias crime will also result in "particular emotional and psychological impact on the victim" (p. 40). Such a
crime "attacks the victim not only physically but at the very core
of his identity. It is an attack from which there is no escape,"
and thus results in a "heightened sense of vulnerability," which
in turn has been shown to cause "depression or withdrawal,...
anxiety, feelings of helplessness, and a profound sense of isolation" (p. 40). Third, bias crimes harm not only the victim, but
also the "target community" (p. 41). The "additional harm of a
personalized threat felt by persons other than the immediate
victims of the bias crime," Lawrence asserts, "differentiates a
bias crime from a parallel crime and makes the former more
harmful to society" (p. 42). Finally, Lawrence contends that
bias crimes impart a distinct set of societal harms that are not
implicated by parallel crimes, because they "violate . . . the
shared value of equality among... citizens and racial and religious harmony in a heterogeneous society" (p. 43).
Despite his harm-based justification for penalty enhancement, Lawrence specifies that determinations regarding who
merits such enhancement should not take actual harm into account. Rather, the "critical factor in determining an individual's guilt for a bias crime" is bias motivation itself (p. 64). "A
result-oriented focus is particularly inappropriate" because "[i] n
many cases, the harms associated with a bias crime depend entirely on whether the victim, the target group, and the society
perceive the perpetrator's bias motivation," and the offender
"may often have little control" over that perception (pp. 64-65).
Thus, a defendant who has successfully concealed the role hate
played in his offense (Lawrence calls this offender a "Clever Bias
Criminal") should be punished for a bias crime-even, presumably, if the result of his deception is that none of the excess
harms typically associated with bias crime come to pass. Correspondingly, a defendant whose crime was only unconsciously
motivated by the defendant's membership in a particular group
(an "Unconscious Racist") should not be punished as a bias
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criminal-even, presumably, if his crime gives rise to all of the
excess harms associated with bias crimes. "[A] ctual harm," Lawrence reasons, "has never been a sine qua non for guilt, and
there is no reason that bias crimes should be an exception to
this rule" (p. 67).
In light of the retributivist and utilitarian rationales for
criminal punishment, Lawrence favors the racial animus model
over the discriminatory selection model (p. 74). The case of the
purse snatcher, who selects female victims but who bears no
animus towards women, demonstrates to him that the discriminatory selection model overreaches. The purse snatcher "deserves" no more punishment as a result of his rationale for
victimizing women, and requires "neither more nor less" deterrence than that "appropriate for any other common thief' (p.
75). Yet discriminatory selection statutes would nonetheless
dub him a bias criminal and enhance his penalty. Racial animus
statutes would not. Lawrence thus prefers the latter (p. 75).
Lawrence recognizes that prudence alone cannot justify
hate crime legislation; the approach he advocates must, of
course, be constitutional as well. Critics of bias crime statutes
pose the following question: If all that differentiates a hatebased crime from a parallel crime devoid of bias is the perpetrator's opinion regarding the victim or a group to which the victim belongs, then is not any punishment over and above that
available for the parallel crime directed at the offender's beliefs,
and thus violative of his First Amendment rights? As Lawrence
acknowledges, this question assumes heightened legal salience
in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1992 decision R.A. V. v. City
of St. Paul.10 In PA.V, the Court unanimously struck down a
municipal ordinance that read as follows:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

'0505 U.S. 377 (1992).

" Id.
at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN.,
LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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The Court assumed (as it had to, given the case's procedural posture, which I will describe below) that the St. Paul orof speech
category
dinance applied only to "fighting ,words"-a
•
•12
Nonethat was, under the Court's prior cases, proscribable.
theless, the Court found that the ordinance represented an unconstitutional regulation of speech on the basis of both content
(that is, the subject a speaker addressed) and viewpoint (that is,
the particular side of the debate the speaker advocated) .13Under the ordinance, "[dlisplays containing abusive invective, no
matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics ....

The First

Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." 4 Nor could the city forbid the use of fighting words in
the service of bias but license the use of such words in opposition to bias. "One could hold up a sign saying... that all 'antiCatholic bigots' are misbegotten," the Court complained, "but
not that all 'papists' are, for that would insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of' religion.' ' 5 This content- and viewpointbased regulation was, in the Court's opinion, impermissible.
Lawrence acknowledges that RA.V. appeared to prohibit
restrictions on racist hate speech, but claims that there is "a
critical distinction between racist speech and bias crimes" which
allows us to enhance the penalties for the latter despite that
case's holding (p. 82). He begins by considering, and rejecting,
flawed bases for this distinction. The first failed approach is that
employed by the Supreme Court in its post-R.A.V decision Wisconsin v. Mitchell.'5 Mitchell, an African-American man, was convicted of aggravated battery. 7 His sentence was enhanced,
pursuant to a Wisconsin statute, because he had intentionally selected his victim on account of that victim's race. The Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned the penalty enhancement,
holding, inter alia, that the statute "violate [d] the First Amendment directly by punishing what the legislature ha[d] deemed
12Id. at

381.

"See id.at 391-92.
Id. at 391.
id.at 391-92.
'0 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
7id at 479.
" See id. at 479-80.
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to be offensive thought," 9 and that under R.A.V, "the Wisconsin legislature [could not] criminalize bigoted thought with
which it disagree [d]."2 The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying primarily on the distinction between "speech"
and "conduct": "[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. 2 1 Thus, whereas the St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A. V.
"was explicitly directed at expression," the Wisconsin penaltywas "aimed at conduct unprotected by the
enhancement statute
22
First Amendment."
Lawrence rejects the Mitchell Court's reliance on the distinction between speech and conduct. He argues that the two are
"not merely intermingled" but in fact "inextricable" (p. 91).
Lawrence invokes Professor John Hart Ely's discussion23 of the
Supreme Court's leading case on that distinction, United States v.
O'Brien. 24 Ely wrote that: "burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and
100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same
time communication, and no communication that does not result from conduct."' This analysis, Lawrence argues, holds for
bias crimes and hate speech. Both involve behavior that is simultaneously all conduct and all expression. Any labeling will
necessarily be result-oriented: "That which we wish to punish we
will term 'conduct' with expressive value, and that which we
wish to protect we will call 'expression' that requires conduct as
its means of communication.... [I]f a meaningful distinction
between bias crimes and racist speech exists, we must find it
elsewhere" (p. 92).
After dismissing arguments based on the distinction between "pure bias crime statutes" and "penalty-enhancement
statutes"-he contends that the two serve the same purpose and
are similarly justified, and must therefore float or sink together
(pp. 92-94)-Lawrence presents his own justification for distin-

'"

State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992).

20Id at

815.

21 Mitchell,

508 U.S. at 484.

at 487.
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancingin FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1494-96 (1975).
2'391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
Ely, supra note 23, at 1495.
2Id.
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guishing bias crime from hate speech. Ultimately, he urges, the
difficulties raised by RA.V. are to be solved by looking beyond
bias to the defendant's underlying conduct. He contends that
"[f]ree expression protects the right to express offensive views
but not the right to behave criminally" (p. 7). Stripped of the
bias element, hate speech is merely speech, and speech, generally speaking, may not be regulated for content. In contrast, he
contends, "[t] he nonbias element of a bias crime.., is an actual
parallel crime that is punishable" (p. 7), and the bias element is
therefore punishable as well. The mens rea of a racist speaker,
Lawrence asserts, is "strictly one of expressing himself' (p. 95).
In contrast, the hate criminal intends not only expression but
also the commission of the parallel crime (pp. 95-96). Absent
bias, hate crimes would still be regulable but hate speech would
not be. For this reason, Lawrence contends, hate crimes may be
regulated in a content- or viewpoint-conscious manner, even if
hate speech may not be.
Lawrence next examines the federal role in policing and
prosecuting bias crimes. After carefully tracing federal involvement in combating racial violence (pp. 118-49), he addresses
the question of whether the federal government should play any
such role, given the Constitution's limits on federal power and
the states' traditional prerogative in criminal law enforcement.
As Lawrence states, the "constitutional authority for most of the
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction has been congressional power over interstate commerce" (p. 151). That power
has also grounded much of the federal government's effort to
protect civil rights. He notes, though, that the Commerce
Clause "is a poorer fit with federal civil rights crime laws" (p.
152), and urges greater reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment, which bars slavery or involuntary servitude, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which bars the official denial of due
process of law. These Amendments, Lawrence contends, offer
constitutional authority for the prohibition of private and public discrimination, respectively (p. 154).
Another basis for a federal role is the strong national interest in regulating hate-based bias. "[C] ases involving racially motivated violence are likely to be of great local notoriety and to be
politically charged" (p. 155). Such cases might prove more
problematic for a District Attorney concerned about reelection
than for a United States Attorney who is likely appointed, who
most probably will serve for only four years, and who will try
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cases before an appointed judge with life tenure assuming good
behavior. Finally, the federal government has an interest in
punishing hate because "[r]acial motivation implicates the
commitment to equality that is one of the highest values of our
national social contract" (p. 156). Bias crimes, then, are crimes
against the national community, and thus require a federal response.
Lawrence concludes with a plea regarding the necessity of
punishing hate. Because criminal punishment "carries with it
social disapproval, resentment, and indignation" (p. 163), bias
crime statutes can be a powerful tool for denouncing the hateful personality. Such legislation, Lawrence contends, would
"constitute [] a societal condemnation of racism, religious intolerance, and other forms of bigotry" (p.16 7 ). Complacence, in
contrast, would send "a message that racial harmony and equality are not among the highest values held by the community" (p.
168).
II. PUNISHING HARM: A COUNTER-PROPOSAL
Lawrence presents a compelling case that we must marshal
our legal resources to fight hate-based violence. Moreover, he
brings an impressive array of sociological, philosophical, and legal argument to bear on this problem. PunishingHate2 6 is doubtless an important entry in the developing canon on hate crime
regulation, and will be useful for laypersons, lawyers, and academics alike.
But like most thoughtful discussions, Lawrence's raises as
many questions as it purports to answer. One such question is
whether the legal device he champions-penalty enhancement
for crimes motivated by bias-serves his ends better than its alternatives. Lawrence's analysis uses bias as a proxy for enhanced harm and the intent to inflict such harm-and thus as a
trigger for enhanced punishment. I intend to concentrate my
comments on this strategy, the implications of which reverberate throughout several of the central fields of Lawrence's inquiry. Specifically, I suggest that Lawrence's approach raises
troubling concerns regarding his framework's compatibility
both with traditional justifications for criminal punishment and

6

2 LAWRENcE,

supranote 5.
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with the First Amendment's proscription on content- and viewpoint-based regulation of expression.
A. BIAS AS PROXY IN PUNISHINGHATE

First, it is important to delineate the ways in which bias, in
Lawrence's account, serves as a proxy for actual harm. Initially,
one might assume that Lawrence's use of the bias proxy is the
necessary consequence of a legal regime that must rely on actual, imperfect evidence in reaching final determinations with
grave consequences. That is, one could envision a proponent of
"bias as proxy" advocating the use of a proxy only because it was
more efficient for courts to rely on bias as an indication that the
crime likely involved the actual or desired infliction of certain
physical and psychological harms to the victim and the victim's
community than for those same courts to conduct case-by-case
inquiries into those harms. But this is not Lawrence's point.
Rather, he champions the primacy of bias even when we have
reason to believe it to be, or know it to be, a failed proxy for secondary harm or the intention to inflict such harm. Consider an
example from the book's opening pages. Lawrence asks his
reader to:
[sluppose that an argument between a landlord and a tenant of different races erupts because of the tenant's claim that the apartment is inadequately heated. As the argument becomes more intense, angry
words are exchanged, including racial epithets. Ultimately, the argument boils over into an altercation in which one of the parties assaults
the other. Should we consider this assault to be a bias crime? The answer will turn on the role that prejudice played. If we conclude that the
argument itself was the primary reason for the eruption of the fight and
that the assault would have occurred regardless of the racial difference
between the two, then this is not a bias crime. If, by contrast, we conclude ...

that the assault would not have occurred had the victim not

been of his race, then this is a bias crime (p. 10).

The key inquiry, then-the inquiry that will determine, for
Lawrence, whether the offender receives only punishment x
(for the parallel crime) or punishment x plus punishment y (for
the bias element) -concentrates on factors that will not change
the harm inflicted one bit. Whether the victim and his racial
community will endure the special psychological harms associated with bias crimes will likely depend far more on their perceptions of the offender's motivation than on his actual
motivation. The "heightened sense of vulnerability" and the
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"psychological trauma of being singled out because of one's
race" (p. 40) about which Lawrence rightly worries will not apply to at least some victims who are attacked by biased assailants-namely, those who do not perceive the assailant's racial
motivation. But this perception-and the question whether it
gives rise to the relevant secondary harms-is absent from Lawrence's analysis. Indeed, he contends that "the kind of harms
that we wish to measure cannot be restricted to the individual
reactions of particular victims" (p. 53).
The centrality of bias rather than secondary harm in Lawrence's designation of actual bias criminals is cemented in his
discussion of the "Clever Bias Criminal" and the "Unconscious
Racist." Lawrence believes the former should be punished as a
bias criminal even though his deception has mitigated the secondary harms otherwise associated with hate crimes, while the
latter should be absolved of any bias crime liability despite the
secondary harms his crime is likely to inflict on the victim and
his community.27
There is a tension between Lawrence's reliance on secondary harms as a justification for enhancing the penalty of offenders motivated by bias and his simultaneous rejection of a
link between those harms (or even intent to cause them) and a
particular offender's classification as a bias criminal. We must
at least consider the possibility that rather than keying penalty
enhancements to bias on the ground that bias crimes tend to inflict greater harms than parallel crimes, we should simply single
out those criminals who intend and/or actually cause the secondary harms Lawrence so eloquently describes. 28 This approach would be less likely to result in unjustified punishment
and less likely to encroach upon crucial First Amendment pro'For more on the use of the bias proxy in hate crime laws, see Anthony M. Dillof,
Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1015, 1051-62 (1997).
' The term "and/or" is not meant, and should not be understood, to imply that
causation of harm alone justifies punishment. As I will explain in some detail, both
utilitarian and retributive rationales for punishment demand some degree of intentionality (usually framed in terms of the offender's actual or constructive knowledge
that certain consequences might ensue from his behavior) before imposition of the
criminal sanction is authorized. Thus, causation of secondary harm is neither sufficient (in which case "or" alone would be appropriate) nor necessary (in which case
"and" alone would be appropriate) for enhanced punishment, but is nonetheless
relevant.
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tections than the regime Lawrence proposes, but would serve
the same ends, and serve them well.
B.

QUESTIONING BIAS AS PROXY: RATIONALES FOR PUNISHMENT

On examination, Lawrence's singular focus on bias is troubling from the perspective of justifying criminal punishment.
As described below, the use of bias as proxy groups biased offenders together without regard for the intended or actual causation of the secondary harms Lawrence relies on to justify
penalty enhancement. American criminal jurisprudence, however, requires that relevant distinctions among offenders be reflected in the punishment they receive. Here, I argue that
Lawrence's approach overlooks critical distinctions among biased offenders and thus risks delegitimizing punishment of certain individuals he would label "bias criminals." Moreover, once
we develop the tools to distinguish those who deserve penalty
enhancement from those who do not, we find that reference to
"bias" is, in fact, superfluous.
The criminal sanction is the state's most potent weapon
against the individual. Punishments "brand [the offender] with
society's most powerful stigma and undermine his life projects,
in career or family, disastrously."29 We therefore must always
situate our discourse regarding particular punishments within a
broader understanding of the bases that justify the devastation
that such punishments inevitably entail for the criminal defendant. As Justice Kennedy wrote in a concurrence to the 1991
case Harmelin v. Michigan:
Determinations about the nature and purposes of punishment for
criminal acts implicate difficult and enduring questions respecting the
sanctity of the individual, the nature of law, and the relation between law
and the social order.... The efficacy of any sentencing system cannot be
assessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of the penal
31
system.

While the Supreme Court will not require that punishment
be justified by any particularrationale,3 2 it must-as Justice Ken1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMrs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERs 4

(1984).
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
'J

Id. at 998-99 (KennedyJ, concurring).

See id (KennedyJ., concurring).
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nedy suggests-be justified by some rationale. Thus, for example, in Coker v. Georgia,ss the Court stated that under the Eighth
Amendment, 34 "a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional
if it ... makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment."35 Similarly, in his Furman v. Georgia3 6 concurrence, Justice Brennan found the Eighth Amendment to embody a commitment to human dignity and to the notion that
punishment is unacceptable "when it is nothing more than the
pointless infliction of suffering" 3 -- that is, when "the punishment serves no penal purpose niore effectively than a less severe
punishment."""
A corollary to the requirement that punishment serve acceptable goals is the requirement that differently-situated offenders should not be treated alike unless different treatment is
consistent with those goals. Put differently, if a given rationale
prescribes unequal punishment for two offenders but they receive equivalent sentences, at least one of them will suffer punishment not in accord with that rationale. If the punishment
allotted accords with that merited by the more culpable of the
two, then the less culpable has been subjected to an "'excessive'
and unconstitutional" sanction because the difference between
the penalty merited and the penalty received "makes no
3 9 measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.
By relying on bias as proxy, Lawrence obscures important
distinctions within the class of those he would label bias criminals, and thus risks inflicting unjustified punishment on at least
some of that class's members. Consider the four following archetypal individuals, all of whom would, in Lawrence's view, be
guilty of bias crimes and subject to enhanced punishment. First
is the "Classic Bias Criminal," who acts out of bias (that is, who
partakes in actual racial animus); who intends (that is, he knows
or should know) that his crime will inflict secondary harms
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CoNST. amend. VIII.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 393 (1989)
(quoting Coker); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (quoting Coker).
'

408 U.S. 238 (1971).

7 Md at 279 (Brennan,J., concurring).

Id at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
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upon the victim and/or the victim's community; and whose intentions in that regard are fulfilled.
Second is the "Failed Bias Criminal," who also is motivated
by bias and who also intends to cause secondary harms, but
whose crime, for whatever reason, inflicts no harms beyond
those associated with the relevant parallel crime. If, for example, the landlord in the example reproduced above instigated
the altercation with his tenant for bias-related reasons, and
hoped to send a message to other tenants or potential tenants
of the same race that they were not welcome in the building,
but both the tenant and the tenant's racial community viewed
the incident as a simple race-neutral housing dispute, then the
landlord might be classified as a Failed Bias Criminal.
Third is the "Localized Bias Criminal," who is motivated by
bias, but who never intends to cause any harms beyond those associated with the parallel crime; who has little (but not necessary no) reason to believe such harms will ensue; and who does
not, in fact, cause any secondary harms. This offender dislikes
his victim and his dislike is motivated by some particular characteristic related to race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, but his crime is not designed to inflict particular
psychological harms upon either the victim or others like him,
and does not, in fact, inflict any such secondary harm. The
harm, that is, is localized.
Fourth is the "Accidental Bias Criminal," who, like the Localized Bias Criminal, intends no secondary harms, but whose
actions inflict such harms anyway. This eventuality might result,
for example, if the Localized Bias Criminal's victim and/or his
community realize-or simply assume-that the attack was motivated by bias and begin to fear that similar future attacks could
result from others' biases.
These archetypes represent the four categories that result
when all biased criminals are differentiated along two separate
axes: intent to cause secondary harms and the actual causation
of such harms. The "Classic" and "Failed" Bias Criminals intend
to cause secondary harms; the "Localized" and "Accidental" do
not. The "Classic" and "Accidental" Bias Criminals actually
cause such harms; the "Failed" and "Localized" do not. This
taxonomy of bias criminals might be represented by the following simple chart:
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FIGURE 1.
Intended Secondary
Causation of

No Intended Secondary
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Harm

Classic Bias Criminal

Accidental Bias

Failed Bias Criminal

Localized Bias Criminal

Criminal

Secondary Harm
No Causation of
Secondary Harm

The distinctions among the four archetypes are central to
our commonly-accepted rationales for punishment, and the legitimacy of Lawrence's proposal is weakened by his failure seriously to confront them. To understand why, we must revisit
those rationales. I address retributivism and utilitarianism, the
two schools of thought Lawrence describes, and then apply
these schools of thought to the archtypes.
Retributivist theory "holds . . . that man is a responsible

moral agent to whom rewards are due when he makes right
moral choices and to whom punishment is due when he makes
wrong ones."40 This theory traces its lineage to Immanuel Kant,

whose ethics hinge on a belief that man's capacity to reason ento deduce,
dows him with autonomy
41
"t
... and with a responsibility
..
and to abide by, a priori moral imperatives. These imperatives
operate independent of the particular effects of any given acdon. Thus, in his volume regarding the criminal law, Kant declares: "The law concerning punishment is a categorical
imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happiness looking for some advantage
to be gained by releasing 'the criminal from punishment or by
reducing the amount of it.

'42

Rather, "[w]hat makes punish-

mentjust, regardless of the social good that might follow, is that

40

HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9

(1968).

", See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 70 (HJ.
Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785); see generally BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY
OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 710-11 (1945); Pierre Hassner, Immanuel Kant, in HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 581, 585-95 (Leo Strauss &Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
4

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTfCE 100 (John Ladd trans.

& ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797). For more on Kant's derivation of the duty to
punish offenders, see, e.g., EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL
PUNISHMENT 9 (1966);John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 THE PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY238, 238-40 (1979).
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it is a fitting social response to the commission of the crime.""
Georg Wilelm Friedrich Hegel elaborated upon Kant's theory.
Hegel saw in each criminal act a coercion that infringed upon
the liberty of other autonomous beings. Punishment, for
Hegel, represented a response to that coercion: "The sole positive existence which the [incursion into others' autonomy] possesses is that it is the particular will of the criminal. Hence to
injure [or penalize] this particular will as a will .

.

. is to annul

the crime, which otherwise would have been held valid," and
thus to restore that autonomy." Punishment, on this view, must
be carefully calibrated to the offense, such that it properly counterbalances the transgressor's incursion against the rights he has
violated."
For both Kant and Hegel, then, punishment must correspond to the offender's violation of moral law. The fitting response is measured by the harm caused and the offender's
degree of blameworthiness-that is, the extent to which the offender has willed, or at least foreseen, the harms flowing from
his actions. As philosopher Robert Nozick has framed the issue,
"[tlhe punishment deserved depends on the magnitude H of
the wrongness of the act, and the person's degree of responsibility r for the act, and is equal to the magnitude of their product, r [times] H. The degree of responsibility r varies between
one (full responsibility) and zero (no responsibility) .46

While

the inquiry into a wrongdoer's level of responsibility (r) once
focused on his depravity or wickedness, it now emphasizes the
degree to which the offender is aware-or should have been
aware-of the consequences of his act.47 Lower r values would
415 (1978).
HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 69 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford University
Press 1953) (1821).
" Holmes succinctly summarized Hegel's position as follows: "[Wirong being the
negation of right, punishment is the negation of that negation, or retribution. Thus
the punishment must be equal, in the sense of proportionate to the crimes, because
its only function is to destroy it." OLvER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 42
(Dover 1991) (1881).
"'ROBERT NoziCm, PI-aOsOpnCAL EXPLANATIONS 363 (1981). Nozick later extends
this analysis, noting that when the harm intended differs from the actual harm done,
H should be assigned a value between the actual and the intended harm. See id. at
389.
47 See, e.g., STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
"

GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3.2, at

',

WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 86 (1988).

Compare ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Book V, ch. 8, at 191-94 (JA.K. Thomson trans., Penguin 1976) (4th cent. B.C.E.);
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thus apply to defendants who could not comprehend the consequences of their actions-such as the mentally ill or those
with impaired cognitive function-as well as those who simply
did not intend, and could not have foreseen, the consequences
of their actions. When r equals zero, a retributivist would oppose punishment altogether.
Harm-the H value-also figures prominently in the retributive account. "[T]he wrongs imposed on society by the offender's conduct should be equal to the costs imposed on the
offender when she is punished."4 An important application of
this principle is retributivism's stance regarding criminal attempts. Although retributivism would sanction punishment of
criminal attempts, it would reject punishment that was equivalent to that imposed upon those who succeed in committing
analogous crimes. "[I]f the offense in question involves dangerous conduct that does not result in significant harm on a
specific occasion," only "slight" punishment is warranted. 49 This

principle is embodied in the criminal laws of many states, which
require diminished punishment for criminal attempts; it is especially prominent in the punishment for attempted murder,
which is nowhere in the United States punished as severely as
the completed crime.5
We see, then, that contrary to Lawrence's assertion that
"[a] ctual harm has never been a sine qua non for guilt" (p. 67),
both intention and harm are central to the retributive account.
Attention to these elements will reveal differences in the punishment deserved by the various offenders who fall into Lawrence's "bias criminal" category.
Utilitarian thinking also emphasizes the importance of intent and, to a lesser degree, harm actually caused. Associated
primarily with the moral philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and
with MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(2) (Official Draft & Revised Comment 1962) (distin-

guishing negligence, recklessness, knowing misbehavior, and purposeful misbehavior
on basis of offender's actual or presumed knowledge regarding the likely consequence of his actions).
" Paul Butler, Retribution,ForLiberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1880 (1999).
"JOSHUADRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CLUMINAL LAW § 6.04, at 42-43 (2d ed. 1995).
" The refusal to punish failed and successful criminal attempts equally extends far
beyond our own borders. See, e.g., EUGENE MEEHAN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPTA TREATISE 23 (1984) ("Almost all countries allot a greater punishment to the completed crime than to the attempt."); see also R.A. DUFF, CRIMINALATTEMPTS 117 (1996)

(noting that the harm resulting from a criminal act often determines both the crime
of which the offender is convicted and as the sentence received).
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John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism is "that principle which approves
or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the
happiness of' society.5 ' On the utilitarian view, " [e] thics at large
may be defined [as] the art of directing men's actions to the
production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness.5 2
Punishment, like all other social institutions, must be judged by
its influence on net happiness. It creates happiness by preventing crime. As Lawrence notes, punishment achieves this end
(1) by deterring the punished offender from committing future
crimes, (2) by deterring other potential offenders, (3) by allowing for rehabilitation of the punished offender, and (4) by incapacitating the offender such that he is unable to prey on
society while imprisoned (or, in extreme cases, after being executed) (p. 46). However, utilitarians also recognize that "all
punishment in itself is evil" because it engenders unhappinessfor
the punished that offsets the salutary effects of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. Thus, "it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.""3
Punishment must be imposed frugally: its benefits must exceed
its costs, and it must be calibrated such that it effects the maximum total happiness.
The utilitarian model, like its retributive rival, is responsive
to questions surrounding harm and intent. The more harm a
crime inflicts, the more unhappiness it is likely to cause. The
more unhappiness a crime causes, the more forcefully society
should act to prevent that crime, and the more severely it may
punish offenders while still remaining within the bounds of frugality. A lifetime in prison for a single pick-pocketing is inappropriate because the sentence inflicts not only more
unhappiness than the crime itself but also, likely, more unhappiness than would have been caused by all the crimes such pun" JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 2 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Harts eds., Clarendon Press 1948) (1823); see also
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publishing Co., 1979)

(1861) ("The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest
happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.").
"' BENTHAM, supra note 51, at 310; see generally RUSSELL, supra note 41, at 773-82;
Henry M. Magrid,John Stuart Mill, in HISTORYOFPOLTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 41,
at 784, 788-90.
53Bentham, supra note 51, at 170.
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ishment prevents; the same cannot be said for a similar sentence
imposed upon a mass murderer.
But utilitarianism's attention to actual harm is more subtle,
more ambivalent, and more closely tied to intent than the above
may suggest. The principle that deterrence demands punishment keyed to harm alone is initially appealing-presumably,
the worse a crime is for society, the more stridently we should
wish to dissuade potential offenders. We must bear in mind,
however, that we can only deter harm-producing conduct, not
harm itself. Put differently, "[p] eople are deterred from actions
when they refrain from them because they dislike what they believe to be the possible consequences of those actions., 54 Thus,
when an offender has no reason to believe that his conduct will
produce harm, increased punishment for causing that harm will
not result in any correlative deterrence.55 Similarly, when an offender has every reason to believe his actions will result in some
degree of harm, a utilitarian would not necessarily withhold
punishment simply because, fortuitously, that harm failed to
materialize.
This is not to say that utilitarianism prohibits any punishment for offenders who do not intend their harms. Often, unintended harms will result from unnecessarily risky behaviorbehavior, that is, which is negligent or reckless because the
actor could have or should have foreseen that he was
irresponsibly increasing the chance that such harms would
occur. Punishment can be employed to deter negligent and
reckless conduct (or to rehabilitate or incapacitate negligent
and reckless actors) just as it can be used to deter intentional
harm-causation (or to rehabilitate or incapacitate intentional
But this discussion does suggest that unlike
actors).s6
retributivist rationales, which demand some harm, utilitarian
justifications for punishment would sanction full punishment
for those who attempt, but fail, to commit a crime. Whereas
many states implicitly adopt the retributive argument, punishing
attempts less severely than completed crimes, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, which govern the punishment of federal
crimes, appear to favor the utilitarian approach. Guideline
4

13 (1991).
" See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Retribution in a Modern Penal Law: The Principle of AggravatedHarm, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 19 (1975).
6
When an offender is truly and understandably ignorant of the risks his conduct
engenders, however, a utilitarian would oppose punishment.
" NIGELWALKER, WHYPUNISH?
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tarian approach. Guideline § 2x1.1 (b) (1) provides that when
an offender completes all the steps necessary to perpetrate a
given crime but has failed nonetheless to succeed in its commission, his attempt will be punished as though he had succeeded.
This inquiry into the utilitarian and retributivist rationales
reveals that we cannot lump the Classic, Failed, Localized, and
Accidental Bias Criminal into one monolithic "bias criminal"
category. Both justifications for punishment require attention
to harm and intent to cause that harm; the focus on bias alone
contemplates neither inquiry.
To begin with, both utilitarians and retributivists would demand a distinction between the punishment accorded to the
Classic Bias Criminal and the Accidental Bias Criminal. Both of
these offenders cause the secondary harms that justify our special treatment of hate crime, but only the Classic Bias Criminal
intends or has reason to know that these harms will result from
his actions. In the retributive calculus, then, the Accidental Bias
Criminal's rvalue is far lower vis-4-vis those harms than his Classic counterpart's; indeed, that value would equal zero if the Accidental Bias Criminal had no reason to believe that he would
cause such secondary harms. Assuming their H values are
equal, the Classic Bias Criminal has committed a more serious
infraction against the moral law than has his Accidental counterpart, and his punishment must be more serious, accordingly.
For the utilitarian, though both offenders have committed a
parallel crime worth preventing, and both have inflicted secondary harms beyond those ordinarily associated with that crime,
the Classic Bias Criminal had far more reason to know that his
actions would result in those harms. As demonstrated above,
penalty enhancement for genuinely accidental infliction of secondary harms serves no utilitarian end, and as the actor's level
of responsibility declines, the rationale for deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation weakens. On both accounts, then,
treating the Accidental Bias Criminal as though he were a Classic Bias Criminal would "make [] no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment5' 8 and would violate the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Under retributivist theory, the Failed Bias Criminal also deserves less punishment than the Classic Bias Criminal. Though
57 SeeU.S.S.G.

5

§ 2X.1.1(b) (1).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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they share the same degree of responsibility for their crimesthe same r-the two have caused widely disparate harms. The
product, then, of r and H will be far lower for the Failed Bias
Criminal than for the Classic Bias Criminal. Note that this distinction tracks the retributivist's preference that those guilty of
criminal attempts be treated more leniently than those who succeed, for the Failed Bias Criminal is simply an attempted Classic
Bias Criminal who has been unable to effectuate his intentions.
But just as utilitarians are likely to disagree with retributivists over the punishment of criminal attempts, so too the utilitarian will be less willing to differentiate between the Classic
Bias Criminal and the Failed Bias Criminal. Each has acted with
intent to cause secondary harms; the latter has simply met with
failure through no fault of his own. The two are equally appealing candidates for deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. For the utilitarian, then, the Failed Bias Criminal may
merit punishment identical to that accorded to the Classic Bias
Criminal.
Finally, however, utilitarians and retributivists will agree that
irrespective of whether Failed Bias Criminals belong with Classic
Bias Criminals in the class meriting the most punishment or
with Accidental Bias Criminals in the class meriting less punishment, Localized Bias Criminals merit even less than otherwise similar Accidental Bias Criminals (unless, that is, each had
no reason to know that any secondary harms might result, in
which case neither should be accorded any enhanced punishment). Although the Localized Bias Criminal harbors what may
be abhorrent opinions-he is, we have assumed, motivated by
hate-he neither intends, expects, nor actually inflicts secondary harms. To the retributivist, the Localized Bias Criminal's
H value vis-il-vis those harms is zero, and his r value is low (if he
had any reason to know secondary harms would result) or zero
(if he did not); he thus deserves no more punishment than one
who commits the analogous parallel crime. Similarly, the utilitarian would likely find nothing to deter beyond the underlying
parallel offense-no intentional, negligent, reckless, or even
wholly accidental infliction of secondary harm, and no dangerous actions that only fortuitously failed to result in harm.59
" As it becomes more and more likely that this offender should have known that
secondary harms would result, his conduct will seem more and more negligent, or
even reckless. Correspondingly, his rvalue will approach 1-signifying full responsi-
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Moreover, a Localized Bias Criminal does not require any more
rehabilitation or incapacitation than one who commits the relevant parallel crime, because the former's behavior was no different from the latter's.w Absent the intention to cause harms
and the actual causation of such harm, Lawrence's case for enhanced punishment evaporates. To penalize the Localized Bias
Criminal more than a parallel criminal motivated by greed or
race-neutral personal animosity would be to punish mere
thoughts, as the former neither intends nor expects any greater
harm than the latter. Assuming the Classic, Failed, and Accidental Bias Criminals receive the appropriate degree of punishment, treating the Localized Bias Criminal like any of these
would result in an excessive, unwarranted, and unconstitutional
application of state power.
The use of bias as a proxy for harm is thus inferior, from the
point of view of both the retributivist and the utilitarian rationales for punishment, to a focus on secondary harms. Both rationales would divide Lawrence's "bias criminal" category into at
least three groups, 6' at least one of which (the one including the
Localized Bias Criminal and any Accidental Bias Criminal who
truly bore no responsibility for secondary harms) would deserve
no punishment in excess of that allotted to those who commit
the appropriate parallel crime.
A supporter of the focus on bias could respond, of course,
that the analysis presented here represents simply the next step
to Lawrence's inquiry-that is, whereas Lawrence has established the case for punishing bias crimes more severely than
parallel crimes, the argument presented here concerns the subsidiary issue of how we should differentiate among bias criminals. But this response is not quite right, for the above analysis
bility-and he will resemble more and more the Failed Bias Criminal, because, as
noted above, foreknowledge of consequences is more salient in the modern American criminal law than is evil intent. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
0 Unless, of course, we hope to engage in the suspect project of "rehabilitating"
the offender's biased opinions.
"' For the retributivist, the three sets are: Classic Bias Criminal, Accidental Bias
Criminal/Failed Bias Criminal, and Localized Bias Criminal. For the utilitarian, they
are: Classic Bias Criminal/Failed Bias Criminal, Accidental Bias Criminal, and Localized Bias Criminal.
Further, as suggested in the text, both the Accidental and the Localized bias
criminals will likely escape enhanced punishment altogether if they truly should not
have expected that secondary harms would result from their conduct-even if they
harbored "bias" as Lawrence would define it.
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in fact questions the very relevance of bias itself. If one is persuaded that we must reference an offender's intention to cause
secondary harms and his actual causation of such harms, then
one must doubt whether bias itself ought to play any role at all.
Imagine, for example, that (1) an offender who bears no animus toward a particular minority group but stands somehow to
gain from the infliction of secondary harms upon that community62 (2) commits a crime that he expects will inflict such
harms, and (3) that the crime has the planned result. Is this individual any less subject to the arguments for an enhanced penalty than the Classic Bias Criminal?
No.
His level of
responsibility is the same vis-A.-vis those harms-he fully intended them-and the harms themselves are the same as well.
A retributivist would find him as morally culpable as the Classic
Bias Criminal. A utilitarian would find equal cause to deter, to
rehabilitate, or to incapacitate him or others like him, because
he is as likely as his biased counterparts to create harm.
Though the presence or absence of bias may shed light on just
how despicable the offender is, it does nothing to elucidate the
deserved punishment.
A supporter of "bias as proxy" might also respond that the
focus on secondary harm would be impracticable from an evidentiary standpoint. It is not at all clear, however, that Lawrence's approach does not face equally daunting hurdles. True,
an assessment of secondary harms might well require testimony
linking the crime to particularized psychological effects. 3 The
evaluation of an offender's bias, however, would require evidence not only depicting the defendant's innermost beliefs and
attitudes, but also linking that inner world view to a specific incident of wrongdoing. Such evidence might be just as difficult
to secure and to evaluate.

62 Imagine,

for example, an individual who sells firearms and whose business might

be improved by the exacerbation of racial tensions in his area.
63 In this respect, testimony regarding the secondary harms inflicted by bias criminals would resemble the so-called "victim impact evidence" currently heard in many
criminal courts throughout the United States. Such evidence, offered by a crime's
victims or, in the case of homicide, by its victim's survivors, typically addresses the
psychological effects the crime has wrought upon the witness and is offered in an attempt to secure an enhanced penalty as would be the evidence at issue here. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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Thus, the argument of this section must be viewed not
merely as a finesse on the use of bias as proxy, but as a challenge
to the very reference to bias. The focus on bias, rather than on
the intent to cause secondary harms and the causation of those
harms, obscures crucial distinctions among offenders. Sometimes-perhaps even in most instances-bias will correspond to
this intent and harm-causation. Where the two do not overlap,
though, a more refined inquiry is required. The factors that
guide that inquiry, I have suggested, will render the focus on
bias irrelevant in all cases.
C. QUESTIONING BIAS AS PROXY: RA.V AND HATE CRIME
REGULATION

Lawrence's choice to target "bias," rather than an offender's
intent to cause secondary harms or the causation of such harms,
also encumbers his arguments with perhaps unnecessary First
Amendment baggage. His attempts to distinguish the hate
crime statutes he champions from the hate speech ordinance
invalidated in RA.V64 are unpersuasive, but he could have
avoided R.A.YV's shadow by concentrating on secondary harm
instead of bias.
While one can understand why Lawrence would like to station his proposal within, rather than in opposition to, current
constitutional doctrine, there is far more tension between his
arguments and the RA.V Court's than he acknowledges. Lawrence reasons that the non-bias analogue to hate speech is simply speech, and that the R.A.V Court reached the appropriate
result because speech absent bias is not regulable. In contrast,
he argues, bias crimes may be regulated, because even absent
bias, they are still crimes.
Lawrence's argument here is flawed in two important respects. First, the RA. V Court assumed that the ordinance at issue only governed "fighting words," a category of speech that is
regulable. Second, it is clear that Lawrence is comfortable with
just the sort of viewpoint-based content regulation that the
R.A. V court rejected, even though this aspect of his argument is
muted in the section of PunishingHate that addresses the First
Amendment. This section elaborates these two difficulties and

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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suggests that, as above, Lawrence's ends might have been better
served by a focus on secondary harms rather than on bias.0
First, Lawrence's distinction between hate speech and bias
crime relies on a differentiation between speech and nonspeech conduct that was not operative in R.A.V He contends
that "[w]ithout racial content, there is no suggestion that [hate]
speech could be or should be prohibited" (p. 94), but that bias
crimes, in contrast, could still be prohibited absent racial motivation. This argument would hold if we agreed that but for the'
racial element, the conduct prohibited by the ordinance at issue
in R.A.V. would constitute ordinary speech. But this is not so.
Before his case reached the United States Supreme Court, Robert Viktora, the RA.V. defendant, asserted in Minnesota's Supreme Court that the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad, because it reached constitutionally protected (albeit
offensive) speech.6 In a previous case, however, that court had
interpreted the phrase "arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in
others" to refer only to conduct that constituted "fighting
words;" 67 in R.A.V., it followed suit, and thus deemed the ordiThe United States Supreme
nance at issue constitutional.6
Court was bound by the Minnesota court's interpretation of St.
Paul's ordinance. 69 Whereas governmental regulation of most
public speech on the basis of content is permitted only if such
regulation is the most narrowly tailored means of achieving a

Despite the tensions between Lawrence's approach and R.A.V.'s, I do not suggest

that his proposal would be unconstitutional. Indeed, the Mitchell decision strongly
suggests otherwise. Given Lawrence's appropriate discomfort with the Mitchell
Court's reliance on a speech/conduct distinction, his rationale for a bias-based regime's constitutionality seems suspect, and weaker than the defense that could be
mounted on behalf of harm-based bias crime regulation. Thus, his approach raises
difficult constitutional questions given his stand toward Mitchell, even if it is not directly contrary to prevailing constitutional law.
See in reWelfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. 1991)
17 See id. at 510 (quoting In re Welfare of S.LJ., 263 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn.
1978)).
"In any event, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that the ordinance represented "a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public safety
and order," id. at 511, and thus would survive even if not for the "fighting words"
gloss.
" See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381; see also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-70
n.24 (1982).
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compelling governmental interest, 70 analogous regulation of,

fighting words--"those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"-is allowed because such speech is "of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."''

Thus, the R.A.V Court self-consciously limited its holding

to (1) fighting words that (2) were likely to inspire "anger,
alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion,
or gender. 7 2 These are overlapping but distinct categories. As
Viktora's overbreadth claim made clear, not all racist speech
would constitute fighting words; likewise, not all fighting words
would constitute racist speech.7 3

Thus, when we remove the

second defining characteristic-effects related to biased content-we are left not, as Lawrence suggests, with ordinary
speech that can only be regulated in the service of a compelling
government interest, but with speech that still constitutes fighting words, and which consequently is still subject to regulation. In
Lawrence's analogy, hate crime is to parallel crime as hate-based
fighting words are to ordinary speech, but in fact, hate crime is
to parallel crime as hate-based fighting words are to race-neutral
fighting words. It may be true that some racist speakers "lack[] the
.. mens rea for any parallel crime," (p. 95) but those are not the
speakers with whom Lawrence must concern himself. To distinguish bias crime legislation from the RA.V. ordinance, Lawrence must address those racist speakers who utter fighting words,
and those speakers do not lack the requisite mens rea.74 Even
70

See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry

Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also Rosenberger v. Rector, 515
U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995) ("It is axiomatic that government may not regulate speech
Discrimination
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys ....
against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.").
7, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST.
PAUL, MINN., LEGIs.CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
73Indeed, the "fighting words" at issue in Chaplinsky itself involved not race but political belief: Chaplinsky had accused a City Marshall of being a "damned Fascist." See
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70.
7' For this reason, Lawrence's effort to re-envision the "fighting words" doctrine
(pp. 99-102) seems misplaced. Lawrence distinguishes "[rlacially targeted actions
that are intended to create fear in the addressee"--which are regulable in any
event-from "racially targeted behavior that vents the actor's racism"--which is not
regulable (p. 102). However, R.A.V. addressed the first category, and to distinguish
his proposals from the St. Paul Ordinance, Lawrence must as well.
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stripped of its racial garb, those speakers' words, like the actions
of race-neutral "parallel" criminals, are constitutionally subject
to regulation.75 Lawrence's distinction, which depends upon
the non-regulable character of race-neutral speech (as opposed
to race-neutral crime), therefore fails to shield his proposals
from R.A.V.'s reach, which extends to communicative activities
which remain, for the most part, beyond the purview of the First
Amendment. It appears, then, that Lawrence must either declare his opposition to RA. V or find a new rationale for his
program's constitutionality.
The second flaw in Lawrence's attempt to situate his proposals within prevailing First Amendment jurisprudence is related to the first. Though his chapter on R.A.V. purports to
align his position with the Court's, the rhetoric that animates
his text amounts to a sharp critique of R.A.V's commitment to
viewpoint neutrality. Albeit implicit, this critique raises the
question whether his proposal is truly in keeping with that decision's dictates.
What troubled the R.A.V. Court was that St. Paul had singled out "fighting words .. .that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance."76 The First Amendment,
the Court held, "does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."" Even more disturbing was that St. Paul's ordinance, in
the Court's view, impaired only the expression of certain viewpoints regarding those topics, and thus facilitated a government-prescribed orthodoxy. 78 In what is likely the case's most
frequently quoted passage, the Court declared that "St. Paul
ha[d] no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensbury rules."7 The opinion explicitly rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that such regulation was neces75
Whether the speech in which such speakers partake in fact violates the law will of
course depend on the relevant sovereign's decision whether to regulate fighting
words, but what matters for our purposes is that the sovereign is permitted to regulate
it.
, R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393-94.

at 391.
78But see Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: LA.V. v. City of St.
7Id.

Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124, 148-49 (1993) (questioning whether or not the ordinance did not in fact impose limitations on both sides of any particular debate).
7 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392.
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sary to serve a compelling governmental interest; indeed, to the
Court, "it plainly [wa]s not."80 Rather, by focusing on bias instead of harm, St. Paul had fashioned an ordinance that distinctively served only one interest: "displaying the city council's
8
'
special hostility towards the particular biases.., singled out."

Mindful of the Court's concerns, Lawrence concedes that
"[w] e must ask whether bias crime statutes further an important
interest unrelated to the suppression of racist speech" (p. 106).
But suppression of such ideas-and the fostering of a government-sponsored orthodoxy on racial equality-lie at the heart
of his program. Lawrence champions the "social disapproval"
and "condemnation" immanent in hate crime legislation (pp.
167, 163). Moreover, he makes plain his belief that bias crimes
are worse than parallel crimes in large part because they "violate
...

the shared value of equality among [society's] citizens and

racial and religious harmony in a heterogeneous society" (p.
43). Surely this objection applies with equal force to hate speech,
for such speech threatens to undermine those same ideals.
Given the threat hate speech poses to "racial and religious harmony in a heterogeneous society," we might wonder why Lawrence should not applaud the St. Paul city council for
"displaying... [their] special hostility" toward bigotry grounded
in race, color, religion, creed, or gender. Why, if he favors content- and viewpoint-based hate crime laws (that is, statutes focusing on bias motivation) over their content- and viewpointneutral alternatives (that is, statutes focusing on secondary
harms), would he not similarly prefer content- and viewpointbased hate speech laws over their neutral alternatives? If the answer is simply that the latter are unconstitutional per R.A.V.,
then on what principled basis can we distinguish his bias crime
proposals? It seems that the most likely conclusion is that Lawrence is engaging here in precisely the sort of result-oriented
analysis for which he properly chided the Mitchell court: "[t] hat
which [he] wish[es] to punish [he] ... term s] 'conduct' with

expressive value, and that which [he] wish[es] to protect [he] ..
•call [s] 'expression' that requires conduct as its means of communication" (p. 92).
The disjuncture between Lawrence's framework and RA.V
is further evidenced by his choice to focus on bias as proxy even
at 395-96.
8,Id.at 396.
80 id
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in cases-such as the Localized Bias Criminal's-when we know
it to be a failed proxy. If we were truly intent on punishing bias
crime because it inflicted more harm, and not because we
wished to communicate something about bias itself, why would
we insist on punishing this offender, who neither intends nor
inflicts the harms about which Lawrence is concerned? Indeed,
any doubt that Lawrence is perfectly comfortable with punishing an offender's thoughts is eradicated toward the close of his
book, when he complains that "[i]f a racially motivated assault is
punished identically to a parallel assault, the racial motivation
of the bias crime is... not part of that which is condemned" (p.
169). Here, Lawrence appears to counsel just the sort of statesponsored orthodoxy the R.A. V. court eschewed.
The point here is not simply to ferret out and to criticize
Lawrence's opposition to R.A.V.; he would hardly be the first
prominent legal thinker to oppose that decision. 2 The point,
rather, is that his position is in greater tension with prevailing
constitutional doctrine than he acknowledges; this tension
could prove problematic for hate crime statutes justified by
Lawrence's rationales.
As may have already become clear, the discord between
Lawrence's position and RA.Y could have been sharply mitigated had Lawrence grounded his approach on secondary
harms rather than on a resort to bias as proxy. The R.A. V
Court emphasized that it was not prohibiting all line-drawing
within the category of fighting words, but only content- and viewpoint-basedline-drawing:
When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason,
having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire
is also neutral enough
class of speech from First Amendment protection,
83
the class.
to form the basis of distinction within

82

See, e.g., CASS P. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH

193

(1993); Amar, supra note 78, at 151-61. See also Owen M. Fiss, The Right Kind of Neutrality, in LIBERAuSM DIVIDED 109, 116 (1996) (distinguishing R.A.V's "classic liberalism," which embodies an "exclusive devotion to individual liberty," from

"contemporary liberalism," which is "defined by a dual commitment-to liberty and
equality").
'1 R.A.Y., 505 U.S. at
388.
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Fighting words can be regulated because they cause harm in
and of themselves; they fall within a class of words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. 84 Under RA.V., therefore, hate speech
might properly be regulated by a statute or ordinance that keys
punishment to harm rather than to the expression of certain
ideas. Indeed, the R.A.V. Court explicitly noted that "[a]n ordinance not limited to the favored topics" could serve the same
purposes as the actual St. Paul ordinance, and strongly implied
that such an ordinance would pass constitutional muster.8
Thus, whereas the ordinance at issue in RA.V. singled out
"[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti . . . which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender, 86 one can imagine a constitutionally acceptable
alternative proscribing communications that constituted regulable "fighting words" and tended to arouse a particularlyextreme
degree of "anger, alarm or resentment in others" on any basis.8 7
Such an ordinance would link penalty enhancement not to the
offender's "motivation" (which, as Lawrence himself appears to
acknowledge in his discussion of Mitchell, is inextricably bound
up with his thoughts and expression), but rather to the offender's intent to cause, and actual causation of, secondary
harms.
From this hypothetical content-neutral hate speech code,
the jump to an analogous content-neutral bias crime statute is
quite short. Such a statute would consider an offender's intent
to inflict secondary harms upon the victim and his community
and the offender's actual infliction of such harms. In addition
to better serving the Eighth Amendment's demands regarding
" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Though the Chaplinsky
Court referred to utterances that inflict injury, subsequent decisions have concentrated upon the second prong, which concerns the likely evocation of an imminent
response. See, e.g., Gooding, Warden v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-96.
86 Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN.,
LEGIs.CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
87 The phrase "particularly extreme" here denotes that the ordinance allows compartmentalization of the "fighting words" category, but only when that compartmentalization is grounded on what the R.A.V. Court referred to as the category's
"distinctively proscribable content." RA.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
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the justification for punishment, such a statute would more
deftly evade the First Amendment quagmire signaled by R.A.V.
than would its bias-based alternatives. Because fighting words
can be regulated precisely as a consequence of the harm they
can cause, harm-based regulation within the "fighting words"
category is allowed by RA.V.; there is no reason that harm-based
differentiation among crimes should be treated any differently.
Indeed, such an approach would be consistent with another
strand of the Mitchell decision not mentioned by Lawrence.
Immediately after drawing the speech/conduct distinction, the
Mitchell Court emphasized that, in keeping with the demands of
R.A.V., the statute "single [d] out for enhancement bias-inspired
conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm."8 This rationale is entirely independent of the speech/conduct distinction, and holds even if that
argument does not. It also aligns Mitchell with the analysis
above: Harm-based responses to bias crime are constitutional
even if content-based responses are not.
The focus on harm enjoys another related advantage over
the use of bias as proxy: it minimizes the state's role in determining which groups merit special protection against hate
crimes and which do not. Lawrence contends that in order to
merit special treatment, a prejudice must be "shared by others
in the culture and [be] a recognizable social pathology within
the culture" (p. 11); he then cites specific pathologies calling
for such protection today. In contrast, he describes the narrator
of Edgar Allen Poe's story The Tell-Tale Heart, "who obsesse [d]
over his victim's 'pale blue eye, with a film over it,"' and he
states, conclusively, that "we would be hard pressed to call [the
narrator's] behavior prejudiced in a deep sense" (p. 11). But
Lawrence's approach here is likely too categorical and too inflexible to ensure a legal regime sufficiently responsive to shifting societal power hierarchies. In a diverse and evolving society,
there will be no fixed and permanent demarcation between
those groups that require protection and those that do not.
Anti-blue-eyed sentiment may not constitute a "prejudice" in
contemporary America, but as modern history has repeatedly
demonstrated, the transition from peaceful coexistence to vicious persecution can be quick and unexpected. An ideal hate
crime statute would be responsive to such rapid transitions.
' Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993).
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Of course, bias crime statutes could be amended to reflect
shifts in social hierarchies, but there is reason to doubt whether
the political majorities who exercise legislative power will recognize and respond to evolving prejudices. Although hate
crimes can be perpetrated against those in the majority,"' it
seems likely that minorities defined in terms of race, religion,
ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or otherwise, are more likely to
benefit from the protections offered from bias crime statuteseven when those statutes are drafted in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Though enlightened members of the majority may well favor penalty enhancement for those who victimize the
disempowered, they are likely to care far more about pressing
issues more closely relevant to their daily lives, and thus may not
be quick enough to codify protections for the victims of emergent hatreds. Even worse, bias-focused statutes could become
the tool of an oppressive majority against the persecuted minority.90 Bias crime statutes organized not around particular prejudices but around secondary harm per se would circumvent this
problem by allowing prosecutors to seek, and juries and judges
to impose, penalty enhancements for offenders who attack
members of groups that are prone to secondary harms but not
those groups that have not yet become beneficiaries of biasfocused legislation. In the event, for example, that blue-eyeds
fell victim to invidious persecution and that members of the
blue-eyed community came to view bias-motivated crime against
one blue-eyed "as an attack on themselves directly and individually" (p. 42), Lawrence's approach to bias crime might be incapable of an adequate response. Resort to a codified list of
victim classes is a strategy ill-suited to dealing with emergent
89In Mitchell for example, African-American assailants attacked a white youth. Id.
at 479-80. Long Island Railroad gunman Colin Ferguson attacked Caucasian passengers, as well as Asian-Americans. See, e.g., Milton, supra note 1 atAl.
"As American Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Ira Glasser has written in
relation to hate speech regulation, "[t]he key questions when evaluating the likely
impact of any proposed speech restrictions are: Who enforces it? Who interprets
what it means? Who selects its targets? Minorities have special reason to fear that
those in power-who cannot be relied upon to be responsive to minorities-will most
often use their discretion to limit the speech of minorities." Ira Glasser, Hate
Crimes/Hate Speech, in SPEECH & EQuAlnY: Do WE REALLY HAVE TO CHOOSE? 55, 59
(Gara LaMarche ed., 1996). Thus, content-based restriction of hate speech-or, presumably, bias crime-represents "a political and strategic trap of the worst kind for
the very people it is meant to benefit." Id.; see also id. at 59-61 (cataloguing examples).
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prejudices as they arise, which would-given Lawrence's demand for a "history of discrimination" and/or an "ideology or
world view that connects" those who hate a particular minority
(p. 12)-almost guarantee that the blue-eyed community would
suffer various secondary harms before its members' assailants
were considered bias criminals. In contrast, a prosecutor operating in a harm-based regime could seek an enhanced penalty
for the perpetrator of an anti-blue-eyed attack the very first time
such an attack implicated Lawrence's secondary harms.
III. CONCLUSION

Frederick M. Lawrence's PunishingHate: Bias Crimes Under
American Law?' offers an engaging and important analysis of the
growing American debate over the propriety and permissibility
of bias crime regulation. Lawrence's case that we must take
special measures to address hate-based violence is compelling,
and the book serves as a forceful rejoinder to those who doubt
the necessity of such action. However, Lawrence's choice to
concentrate upon an offender's bias motivation locates his proposals on uncertain constitutional ground. His ends, I have argued, might have been better served by an approach that linked
penalty enhancement to the offender's intent to inflict secondary harms and the actual causation of such harms. Such a
strategy, one suspects, might in fact result in the realization of
Lawrence's "fondest hope": that his children's children, upon
reading PunishingHate, "will be puzzled as to why their grandfather should have spent so much time on something as inconceivable as racial violence" (p. xi).

91 LAWRENCE,

supra note 5.

